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Nowadays, assuring the security of the national cyber-space has become a big issue that can 
only be tackled through collaborative approaches. Threats cannot be confined to a single 
computer system just as much as computer systems are rendered useless without being con-
nected to a supporting network. The authors of this article propose an innovative architecture 
of a system designated to help governments collect and analyze data about cyber-security in-
cidents, from different organizations, dispersed nationwide, and acting within various eco-
nomic sectors. The collected data will make us able to determine a national cyber-security 
alert score that could help policy makers in establishing the best strategies for protecting the 
national cyber-space. 
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Introduction 
A big part of the daily human activity has 
been transferred in the online environment, 
and along with that so has the cyber-crime. 
Cyber-attacks are becoming more and more 
numerous and complex. There are countries 
that are developing real cyber-armies, ready 
to attack in no time. 
Managing the security of an information sys-
tem is not an easy job. We live in the XXI 
century that seems to be under the sign of 
major cyber-attacks and even under the sign 
of cyber-wars. 
The Internet has become an international crit-
ical infrastructure and disturbing its function-
ing could cause big damages to any state. A 
good example in this area is the attack 
against Estonia in 2007. The country was lit-
erally wiped-out from the Internet because of 
a massive cyber-attack that succeeded in af-
fecting numerous governmental websites and 
some financial institutions also. The attack 
lasted for 2 weeks.  
The countries that have critical infrastruc-
tures based upon complex informatics sys-
tems, connected via the Internet (like the 
USA), are the first, and most vulnerable, that 
might suffer from such an attack. Usually, 
these countries are the most willing to invest 
in IT security.  
William J. Lynn, United States Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense  stated in 2011 that USA 
could respond to cyber-threats with propor-
tional military forces. He also stated that the 
cyberspace has become a new field of battle 
among land, sea and air [1]. The 2010 US 
Cyber Security Strategy also states that the 
cyber-security is one of the biggest challeng-
es of the nation, because the Internet is one 
of the key factors related to economic com-
petiveness and an indispensable instrument 
of the business environment. The digital in-
frastructure is considered a national asset, 
and protecting this asset is a national priority. 
[2] 
Thus, we are assisting to a substantial trans-
formation of the international cyber-space, as 
it becomes a key component of the world 
economy. Nowadays IT security has a new 
meaning: it is not a mere defensive concern, 
but it can also work as an offensive strategy.  
The problem is that the state of security, be it 
about an organization or a state, becomes ev-
er more difficult to accomplish through iso-
lated or individual action. Securing and re-
sponding to threats by common efforts and 
cooperation of all parties that could be af-
fected in case of a cyber-security incident, is 
now the new way of action in cyber-defence. 
This trend substantially mirrors the hacker 
community action, which now works at an 
international level, under the umbrella of or-
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ganized-crime. When taking an organization, 
for example, either public or private, the 
cyber security issue cannot be tackled indi-
vidually, but it will have to fulfill  at least 
three conditions: (1) cyber-security legisla-
tion that will incriminate the cyber-attacks 
will have to be put in place, (2) proper ac-
tions will have to be taken by the authorities 
in charge of cyber law enforcement, (3) it 
needs the help of private security providers 
that will develop solutions to stop or mitigate 
the attacks. Security can no longer be locally 
addressed just by merely installing an antivi-
rus or a firewall. Security must be addressed 
globally, beyond the borders of the physical 
network or the intranet. [3] 
All in all, reaching the optimal level of secu-
rity in the modern approach to cyber-security 
cannot be made individually, but with the in-
volvement of all affected and responsible 
parties.  
 
2 The concept of a National Early Warn-
ing System 
The main idea brought forward in this article 
is that the efficient management of infor-
mation security shifted from the individual 
approach, from the intra-organizational level, 
to a more cooperative approach involving as 
many of the concerned parties as possible 
[4]. 
The starting point in adopting this systemic 
approach of security will be the build-up of 
an Early Warning System (EWS) at national 
level. In this article we propose the architec-
ture of a National Early Warning System, 
which will help in the determination of a na-
tional cyber security alert indicator, based 
upon the identification and analysis of a con-
siderable number of cyber-security incidents 
collected from organizations all over the 
country.  The national indicator will help in 
choosing the right policy decisions regarding 
cyber security strategies or attack mitigation 
measures. 
The operating principle behind the EWS is 
represented by the real time collecting of data 
related to different cyber-security incidents, 
from computer systems operated by various 
organizations. In order to be representative at 
the national level, the EWS must collect in-
cidents from a wide range of organizations, 
both public and private, of different sizes, 
within different economic sectors and homo-
geneously distributed across the country. 
Based on the network analysis of inputs 
about cyber incidents, identified within the 
partner organizations, the nature, distribution 
and intensity of those incidents could be de-
termined. This is a very powerful feature that 
could be used for stopping a major incident 
to propagate to multiple systems. For exam-
ple, if a bank is affected by a specific mal-
ware infection, and the incident is detected 
before spreading onto other banks, an alert is 
then sent out to all other potential victims 
ending up in reducing to minimum the distri-
bution and the effects of the incident. Based 
on this early detection, the countermeasures 
could be rapidly developed, with the help of 
the community, and sent out to all interested 
or possibly affected parties.   
As any alert system, so as to function proper-
ly, the EWS needs a series of important pre-
conditions. As we have said before, an im-
portant condition for the well functioning of 
such a system is that information regarding 
cyber security incidents is collected from a 
very wide range of organizations and from 
multiple areas of activity. In this manner, we 
could observe if an attack is targeted at a 
specific field of activity (e.g. banks) or a spe-
cific geographical region.  
Another important condition is that the par-
ticipating organizations should be either usu-
al targets of cyber-attacks or should be pro-
cessing large amounts of traffic (ISP, Banks, 
Universities, Public institutions etc.). Of 
equal importance is that the data should be 
collected in real time, so that the alert and the 
reaction to it should be launched soon after 
the detection, and not after the attack has 
stopped and the damages have settled in. 
Besides the conditions described above, an 
EWS should also accomplish some other re-
quirements, such as: 
•  Powerful correlation and aggregation 
algorithms:  the main purpose is that of 
correlating the data from different 
sources, so the existence of such algo-Informatica Economică vol. 16, no. 2/2012    105 
 
rithms is a must.  
•  Multiple methods of data collecting, 
regarding incidents: the detection of 
malicious activities at network level is of-
ten done by classical IDS/IPS systems. A 
national EWS should use multiple meth-
ods for data collecting, not just IDS. An 
example should be log collecting, honey-
pots, netflow analysis, and anomaly de-
tection. 
•  Capacity of analysis of large amounts 
of data: taking into consideration the 
complexity and dimension of the system, 
it will probably produce huge amounts of 
data that will need extensive processing 
capacity. Without such capabilities the 
system will collapse.  
•  Scalability and platform independence: 
these two characteristics are essential for 
detecting attacks within large-scale net-
works. Moreover, the technology used for 
intrusion detection must work inde-
pendently of the type of equipment used 
by the organization that is hosting the 
sensor. (e.g. syslog capable). 
•  Ability to capture data from mobile 
devices: the mobile devices are continu-
ing to grow in terms of proportions, and 
collecting data from this type of hardware 
is a real issue when developing such a 
system 
•  Compatible with virtualized environ-
ments and cloud type services: cloud 
computing and virtualization are the 
trends now when we speak about IT ser-
vices, and such a system should not leave 
these technologies aside. 
Implementing an alert system could prove of 
great help in detecting a large amount of 
cyber-attacks, such as: DDoS, SQL Injection, 
XSS, viruses, worms, Trojans, botnets. Nev-
ertheless, these incidents could also be de-
tected simply by implementing some 
IDS/IPS solutions in the organizations. The 
major advantage of such a system is that data 
is collected from multiple organizations and 
when aggregated and correlated at a central 
level, we can determine major security inci-
dents that are targeted to specific types of or-
ganizations.  
3 Who could build such a system? 
Developing such a system is not an easy task. 
It has to rest on a set of varied types of or-
ganizations, public and private, acting in dif-
ferent sectors. Reason enough for the exist-
ence of a national authority, responsible for 
the Romanian cyber-space, is a must in 
building this system. Generally speaking, a 
strategy at national level cannot be fulfilled 
without the intervention of the state. That’s 
why an authority responsible with building a 
EWS is the ideal option in this case.  Moreo-
ver, the information gathered and analyzed 
by the EWS has policy implications and utili-
ty, and virtually no commercial use. 
Among all Romanian authorities that deal 
with cyber-crime or are responsible with the 
security of the national cyber-space, we find 
one institution that better suits this role. 
CERT-RO is the National Computer Emer-
gency Response Team, and among its  re-
sponsibilities we can find: 
•  collecting and management of threats, 
vulnerabilities and cyber-security inci-
dents, that are identified or reported to af-
fect the Romanian cyber-space; 
•  national point of contact with other na-
tional or international CERT entities; 
•  provides assistance for national authori-
ties in establishing cyber-security poli-
cies; 
•  provides assistance for organizations that 
operate or own critical infrastructures, 
regarding their cyber-security policies; 
•  develops or improves national regulations 
regarding cyber-security policies; 
•  real time warnings and reports related to 
nature and distribution of cyber-security 
incidents. 
The importance of this structure is also stated 
in the National Security Strategy [5] and in 
the project of the national Cyber-Security 
Strategy [6]. 
Although the Government Decision no. 
494/2011 establishing the role of CERT-RO, 
looks quite comprehensive at a first sight, the 
actual set up is rather unclear. The lawmak-
ers did give CERT-RO some important roles, 
but they failed to specify how things must be 
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warnings regarding the nature and distribu-
tions of cyber-security incidents and national 
management of security incidents, they can-
not be realized without the existence of a 
large amount of information related to differ-
ent types of incidents. This type of data could 
be collected through a system like our EWS.  
Participating in the EWS should not be man-
datory. The system must prove its efficiency, 
and based on its gained reputation, it should 
attract different types of organizations. Nev-
ertheless, the system must start with a mini-
mum number of organizations, and therefore, 
a good strategy could be the involvement of 
public institutions. The cooperation between 
public authorities should theoretically be eas-
ier, and CERT-RO could work as the central 
point of such cooperation. Protocols with 
private companies have always been diffi-
cult, not only in Romania but in other coun-
tries as well, but they could eventually team 
up in a functioning system, given that its rep-
utation is carefully safeguarded. 
 
4 National Early Warning System Archi-
tecture 
As mentioned before, the national EWS 
(NEWS) is a complex system that will con-
nect different types of organizations, through 
a series of sensors installed in their computer 
systems that will ultimately be capable to de-
tect many types of intrusions within the net-
work. 
Based on that information, aggregated and 
correlated within a central module, we could 
determine the nature, intensity and distribu-
tion of major cyber-security incidents that af-
fect the organizations that installed sensors 
within their computer networks, even from 
the early stages of the attack.  
We should mention that the system was de-
veloped to detect all kinds of intrusions, but 
the small ones will only be treated at local 
level, meaning that they will not be sent to 
the central database but will remain in the lo-
cal one and will be treated by the local ad-
ministrator or security responsible.  
The proposed architecture of the national 
EWS consists of its components and a de-
scription of its underlying algorithm, used in 
determining the national cyber-security alert 
level. 
Thus the national EWS is a composite system 
that uses multiple technologies and consists 
of the following three modules: 
1.  Event collecting module (MCE) 
2.  Alerting and Correlating Module (MCA) 
3.  Reporting module 
The three modules design  is represented in 
fig. 1. Following that, in the next subchapters 
we will present a functional and technical de-
scription. 
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4.1. Event collecting module (MCE) 
The role of this module is to analyze traffic 
data at the organizational level (local level) 
and to identify intrusions or potential inci-
dents that could affect the organization’s se-
curity level. The alerts resulted from the data 
analysis is sent to the central database (the 
next module) where the correlation process 
takes place. The traffic analysis is carried out 
through a sensor, which should be a distinct 
component installed inside the computer 
network. The sensor, a passive element of the 
network, will run an IDS/IPS service which 
will be able to analyze  all the traffic pro-
cessed by the system through the following 
technologies: 
•  traffic analysis through deep packet in-
spection; 
•  netflow analysis (source and destination 
IP addresses, source and destination 
ports, protocol used). 
The traffic analysis will be carried out 
through the deep packet inspection (DPI) 
method, meaning that every data packet will 
be completely analyzed by an IDS/IPS appli-
cation, which will determine the attack type 
based on comparing the packet with the sig-
nature from its database.  
The DPI method  is very efficient when it 
comes to detection or prevention of cyber-
attacks or cyber-threats, because, unlike clas-
sic firewalls, the content of the packet is also 
analyzed along with the IP/TCP/UDP header. 
This allows the detection of a much wider 
range of attacks like viruses, Trojans, DDoS, 
or intrusions that manifest themselves 
through disturbances of the normal operating 
mode of a protocol. The IDS/IPS sensor is 
based upon the existence of some rules, also 
called signatures. If one of the rules is broken 
by the packet, or by a sequence of packets, 
the sensor will consider those packets as ma-
licious and it will alert the security personnel 
and even prevent the packets from reaching 
their destination. 
Netflow analysis  is another type of traffic 
analysis used by our considered sensor. 
Netflow is a network protocol developed by 
CISCO for collecting data referred to source 
and destination addresses. A netflow record 
will contain data about source and destina-
tion IP addresses, source and destination 
ports and the protocol used for communica-
tion. These data are used for gathering statis-
tics regarding network traffic, and could be 
used to determine some types of attacks such 
as flooding (DDoS). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Sensor within a network 
 
Basically this module analyses the data traf-
fic at the organizational level, and issues 
alerts about anomalies or intrusions detected 
inside the network. The alerts are transmitted 
to the central module of the national EWS, 
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from other sensors. Fig.2 is a graphical repre-
sentation on how MCE works. 
 
4.2. Correlating and analysis module and 
the method for determining the national 
cyber-alert level indicator (MCA) 
The MCA is the central module of the sys-
tem. It is the module where all the data are 
collected and analyzed. It is the module that 
should, in our vision, be managed totally by 
CERT-RO, the authority that we consider to 
be most suitable for this job. 
The purpose of the module is collection, ag-
gregation and analysis of the data collected 
from the sensors spread at national level. By 
analyzing the correlated data, the system will 
be able to detect large or major cyber-attacks 
targeted to certain fields of activity (energy, 
transports, banks etc.) or groups of organiza-
tions.  
The national EWS has a broader scope than 
just protecting the individual organization. It 
can determine the large scale attacks and mit-
igate them from early stages so that the dam-
ages would not be consistent. Depending on 
the type of attack, it could detect the pattern 
from the scanning stage, before the real at-
tack has started. Correlation is the key ele-
ment of the process, and is also the compo-
nent that distinguishes a national EWS from 
simple EWS or other individual IDS/IPS so-
lutions. The alert launched by the system will 
contribute to stopping the attack while the 
likelihood and impact of the threat is reduced 
consistently, and the attack could be stopped 
before gaining momentum. An attack that 
exploits specific vulnerabilities will trigger 
security alerts to other organizations affected 
by that vulnerability in order to prevent the 
attack from spreading. Therefore, the MCA 
module is a key component in this distributed 
cyber-security system. 
This module has also a public policy role: 
that of determining a national cyber-security 
alert indicator. Based on the analysis of the 
information that it collects, the module calcu-
lates an indicator through analyzing the en-
tire dataset, an indicator that will measure the 
general level of threat in terms of cyber secu-
rity. This indicator will be an important tool 
for the policy makers in the area of protec-
tion and regulation of the cyber space. We 
have argued before that the cyber space is in-
creasingly important in terms of social life 
and economic activity. It therefore cannot 
leave aside the political arena either. Policy 
is growingly concerned with cyber security, 
and large cyber-attacks are, naturally, in the 
attention of the policymakers.   
The fact that the system collects data from 
multiple organizations, from different geo-
graphical areas and different fields of activi-
ty, makes it representative countrywide or at 
certain levels of the economy. The main idea 
is to top the proportionality of such a model 
with the aforementioned national security 
policy role, thus gaining an effective meth-
odology for measuring a cyber-alert security 
indicator based on which the real level of se-
curity within the country could be deter-
mined.  With this  indicator  in view,  policy-
makers could take decisions to tackle cyber 
problems or, on the contrary, to ignore false 
alarms.  
The key factor when determining this indica-
tor resides in correlating the profile of the or-
ganization with  the profile of the cyber-
security threat. Correlation of these variables 
would result in a realistic score of the inci-
dent. Based on incident score, future calcula-
tions must be done in order to obtain the na-
tional indicator.  
Let’s then consider how these profiles should 
look like. In Table 1 we will define the pro-
file of the organization, and in Table 2 we 
will define the profile of the threat. 
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Table 1. Profile of the organization 
No.   Variable   Explanation 
1  Field of activity  This variable is used for classifying the cyber-attacks with regard to 
the economic sector that they target. In this manner,  the indicator 
could also be determined per field of activity, and the organizations 
within that filed could have a more accurate view of their vulnerability 
to cyber crime. We have considered the following 12 main domains of 
activity included in the proposed national EWS: 
•  Public administration 
•  Public / National safety and public safety 
•  Public / E-government services 
•  Agriculture / Food Related Services 
•  Auto / Transportation 
•  Banks / Insurances / Finances 
•  Education / Culture / R&D 
•  Energy / Petrol / Chemistry 
•  Health / Medicine 
•  Software / IT Services  
•  Telecom / Internet 
•  Others 
2  Organization 
type 
Public, private or NGO. Although rather simplistic, as we see nowa-
days complex organizational setups (e.g. Quangos, PPPs, multination-
al organizations, etc), this variable continues to be relevant. The three 
main categories of organizations have distinctive behaviours in terms 
of tackling their cyber vulnerabilities and cannot be ignored by our in-
dicator. 
3  Organizational 
level of securi-
ty  
This level is defined on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 is considered the 
most secured level. The position on the scale is determined by the sen-
sor installation using  a scale inspired from the ISO 27001 standard, as 
follows: 
5 – functional firewall, IDS/IPS, anti-malware solution, up to date sys-
tems, vulnerability scanners, email filtering, VPN for extranet; 
4  –  functional firewall, anti-malware solution, up to date systems, 
email filtering, VPN for extranet; 
3 - anti-malware solution, up to date systems, email filtering; 
2 – not fully functional firewall, not up to date anti-malware solution; 
1 – no firewall, no antimalware, obsolete operating systems. 
4  Critical infra-
structure or not 
The system must also be able to distinguish between critical infra-
structure systems and non-critical infrastructure systems. It is an im-
portant classification because critical infrastructures are the heart of 
every national security system. 
5  Importance of 
confidentiality 
of information 
On a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the most important, we will determine the 
importance of data confidentiality within the participating organiza-
tions. The value of 5 is only awarded to critical infrastructures. 
(5 – very big, 4 – big, 3 – medium, 2 – low, 1 – very low) 
6  Importance of 
availability of 
information 
On a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the most important, we will determine the 
importance of data availability within the participating organizations. 
The value of 5 is only awarded to critical infrastructures. 
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7  Importance of 
integrity of in-
formation 
On a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the most important, we will determine the 
importance of data integrity within the participating organizations. 
The value of 5 is only awarded to critical infrastructures. 
(5 – very big, 4 – big, 3 – medium, 2 – low, 1 – very low) 
 
The organizational profile will be considered 
when determining the real impact of a threat 
to the organization’s computer system and to 
their assets. Nevertheless, so as to determine 
the real severity of a cyber-security incident, 
a series of variables must be defined for the 
operationalization of  the  threat itself. It is 
quite possible that threats targeting an organ-
ization, will not affect the computer system, 
because of particular characteristics, for in-
stance the absence of the specific vulnerabil-
ity that could be exploited. The attack could 
also be targeted to unimportant or redundant 
computer systems, without real worth for the 
organization. In this case the incident should 
not raise artificially the level of the score, be-
cause otherwise the indicator will lose in 
terms of accuracy. Consequently, a profile of 
the attack must also be defined. In the table 
below we exemplify a method for measuring 
such a profile. 
 
Table 2. Incident profile 
No.   Variable   Explanation 
1  Attack category   The list of attack types could look like this, although some other 
types of attacks could be added: 
1.  DDoS / DoS 
2.  Code Injection (SQL etc.) 
3.  Malware 
4.  Botnet 
5.  Phishing 
6.  Spam 
2  Level of threat  The level of threat is defined on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the most 
dangerous incident. This variable defines the external conditions of 
an attack, and takes in consideration independent variables that could 
affect the result of an attack. 
5 – there are specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited, and will 
grant the attacker administrator privileges upon the targeted system. 
4 - there are specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited, and will 
grant the attacker user level privileges upon the targeted system. 
3 – there are no specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the 
threat, but the attacker could gain administrator privileges upon the 
targeted system. 
2 - there are no specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the 
threat, but the attacker could gain user level privileges upon the tar-
geted system. 
1 - there are no specific vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the 
threat, and the attacker cannot gain user level privileges upon the tar-
geted system. 
3  Level of severity  It is defined on a scale of 1 to 5, 5 being the most severe incident. 
The variable defines what type of equipment is targeted by a threat, 
and could have the following values: 
5 – critical equipment that assure the well-functioning or security of 
the network (router, firewall etc.); 
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3 – other servers, applications or hardware which ensure the well-
functioning of the computer system; 
2 – final user PC’s or laptops, that are part of a network; 
1 – home users. 
4  Confidentiality  This variable should have positive values if the attack is likely to af-
fect confidentiality of information. 
5  Integrity  This variable should have positive values if the attack is likely to af-
fect integrity of information. 
6  Availability  This variable should have positive values if the attack is likely to af-
fect availability of information. 
 
Establishing a link between the threat and the 
target itself is an essential process of the na-
tional EWS. The alerts or the indicator itself 
can be influenced by miscalculation of the 
incident score, or the miscorrelation between 
the attack and the organization. 
In other words,  considering an attack that 
triggers losses in terms of confidentiality of 
information, which will target an organiza-
tion that does not consider confidentiality to 
be crucial for the organization; it will not im-
pact too much the national indicator as the 
incident score will be rated low. 
For the calculation of the incident score,  a 
well-structured algorithm must be defined. 
Hence, the incident score will be determined 
after the correlation of the organization pro-
file and incident profile. Here is what has 
been considered as ideal for determining the 
incident score. Let us look into the following 
formula:  
 
Incident score = (Organization’s level of 
security + CIA importance) – (Level of 
danger + Level of severity) 
 
Where:  
CIA importance = the actual impact of the 
threat upon the organization in terms  of 
the effect of the incident upon the overall 
quality of the information (confidentiality, 
integrity, availability). Actually, we  will 
multiply the value defined as “importance 
of confidentiality for  an organization” 
with 1, if the threat affects confidentiality, 
or with 0, if it has no impact upon the con-
fidentiality. The same pattern is applied to 
integrity and availability  of the infor-
mation. In the end, we compose an aver-
age of the  3 values  and  obtain  the “CIA 
importance” score.  
Given that the score can vary quite a lot, 
and the scale proposed for measuring the 
national alert indicator is 1 to 5, the score 
of the incident must be brought down to the 
same  scale. Thus, when defining the inci-
dent level of alert, we would use the scale 
presented in Table 3, which will also be con-
sidered  later on when  determining the na-
tional indicator. 
As an example let us consider a public or-
ganization with the level of security scal-
ing  3 (anti-malware solution, up to date 
systems, email filtering). Let’s assume 
they do not manage any  critical systems 
and have considered the importance of in-
formation properties as follows: confiden-
tiality – 5, integrity – 5, availability – 3. 
This organization would, in our example, 
be confronted with an SQL Injection at-
tack that is generally considered a threat-
ening attack, scaling 5, and with a rather 
high level of severity, scaling 4. This kind 
of attack has consequences upon the integ-
rity and  the  availability  of the target in-
formation or computer system. When tak-
ing  into consideration the organizational 
profile and the threat profile, we should 
refer to  the formula above, inserting the 
values mentioned above. 
 
Incident score = 
(3+(5x1+3x1+5x0)/3) - (5+4) =5,3 – 9 
= -3,6 
 
Continuing our example, when comparing 
the  resulting scores  with those from the 
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cident level of alert is HIGH, meaning that 
the organization is in real danger, and the 
attack could lead to serious damages. 
 
Table 3. Incident’s level of alert 
Incident level of alert  Value obtained 
CRITICAL (5)  < -4 
HIGH (4)  from -4 to -2 
MEDIUM (3)  from -1,99 to +2 
NORMAL (2)  from +2,01 to +5 
LOW (1)  > +5  
  
Based on the incident score, we would be 
able to determine the national indicator. 
However, some prior steps need to be tak-
en: The first step is to (1) calculate given a 
certain time interval, a set of two indica-
tors for each field of activity, one for criti-
cal infrastructures, and one for non-critical 
infrastructures. The indicators would thus 
be determined as an average value of the 
registered incident  scores,  in that  given 
time frame. One of the indicators is for the 
critical infrastructures and one for the non-
critical infrastructures. Below is the math-
ematical representation of the two indica-
tors: 
𝑆𝐶 =
∑ 𝑆𝑗𝐶
𝑛𝑟
𝑗=1
𝑛𝑟
 
 
𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑛 =
∑ 𝑆𝑗𝑛𝑜𝑛
𝑛𝑟
𝑗=1
𝑛𝑟
 
where:  
SC = critical score - average of the values 
recorded as final scores of the  incidents 
that affected critical organizations within a 
certain  area  of activity (e.g. Education / 
Culture / R&D), in a given time interval. 
The score is considered critical because it 
refers to organizations that manage critical 
infrastructures. 
Snon = non-critical score – average of the 
values recorded as final scores of the inci-
dents that affected non-critical organiza-
tions within a certain area of activity (e.g. 
Education / Culture / R&D), in a given 
time interval. The score is considered non-
critical because it refers to organizations 
that do not manage critical infrastructures. 
nr = number of incidents that affected or-
ganizations from an area of activity, in the 
given time frame.  
SjC = the score of one cyber-incident, that 
affected one organization, from a certain 
area of activity (e.g. Education / Culture / 
R&D), that  manage critical infrastructure 
systems. 
Sjnon  =  the score of one cyber-incident, 
that affected one organization, from a cer-
tain area of activity (e.g. Education / Cul-
ture / R&D), that doesn’t manage critical 
infrastructure systems. 
We should mention that specific areas of 
activity that do not record cyber-security 
incidents will be scored  1, meaning the 
lowest level of alert. Applying the formu-
las described above we then pass on to de-
termining the overall score of the area of 
activity. We would be using the scores for 
the critical organization and the scores for 
the non-critical organization, weighted by 
the percentage they represent within the 
total, for each area of activity, using the 
following formula: 
 
𝑆𝑑 = 𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝐶 + 𝑏𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑛 
where: 
Sd = the score for one area within a certain 
timeframe. 
ai = the percentage of organizations within 
a certain field that have critical infrastruc-
ture systems. 
bi = the percentage of organizations within 
a certain field that do not have critical in-
frastructure systems. 
After obtaining an average score for every 
field, we must determine a national indica-
tor for all the organizations included in the 
national EWS. Following the previous 
formulas, the national indicator would 
look like this: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑇 = �𝑥𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑑
𝑛
𝑖=1
= �𝑥𝑖 ∗ (𝑎𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝐶 + 𝑏𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
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where: 
INAT= National Cyber-Security Alert Indi-
cator. 
xi = the percentage of organizations within 
a certain field of activity out of the total 
number of participating organizations. 
Sid = the score for a certain field of activi-
ty, in a given timeframe. 
n = the total number of economic sectors 
(12). 
Based on the methodology described 
above, the national indicator could have 
values between 1 and 5, 5 being the worst 
state of security, and 1, the best. In Table 
4 below we can find a description of these 
values.
 
Table 4. Values taken by the national indicator 
CRITICAL  Correlated cyber-security incidents, intentionally launched, that have strategic targets, and 
could affect the security of the national cyber-space and could cause big damages to the na-
tional economy. 
HIGH  Correlated cyber-security incidents, intentionally launched, that have strategic targets, and 
could affect a certain economic sector or a certain type of organization, without causing big 
damages to the national cyber-space or to the national economy. 
MEDIUM  Correlated cyber-security incidents that could affect various organizations without causing 
big damages to the national cyber-space or to the national economy. 
NORMAL  Isolated incidents, that affects various types of organizations, without causing big damages 
to the national cyber-space or to the national economy. 
LOW  Isolated events, of low severity, affecting various organizations nationwide. 
 
The indicator could be measured  at vari-
ous time intervals  (monthly, yearly  or 
even  daily).  From the above formula we 
could also derive the indicator for the crit-
ical infrastructures or for the non-critical 
infrastructures.  It is convenient to do so 
because, in case of big values of the indi-
cator, the counter-measures should first be 
taken for critical systems.  
We have thus described the methodology 
used for  obtaining a national cyber-
security alert indicator. This indicator is 
prone to reflect the actual situation regard-
ing the nationwide level of cyber-security, 
extrapolating from the registered security 
incidents affecting the participating organ-
izations.  
Unfortunately an exemplification  of the 
way the indicator works  on real data ex-
ceeds the aims of the present article, for a 
few reasons other than the obvious space 
requirements. First of all, at this moment, 
there is no such data collected nationwide. 
Although CERT-RO was set up in July 
2011, in the short time passed, they could 
not build up a significant database. CERT-
RO has gathered now data on less than 100 
incidents. Moreover, a big part of the data 
has been collected only  from public  or 
governmental institutions, failing to access 
information from private actors. The cal-
culus will be of real use only after the alert 
system is set up to include a representative 
sample of organizations. 
 
4.3. Alerting and reporting module (MAA) 
The alerting module of the national EWS is 
also very important because it represents the 
basis for the action to be taken in case of ma-
jor security incidents.  Practically speaking, 
when a major attack is detected, meaning an 
attack that affects several organizations and 
that follows certain patterns (e.g. the same IP 
source is identified to attack multiple organi-
zations), we could conclude that the attack is 
intentionally launched and could affect more 
targets in the near future. At this stage, alerts 
would be sent to all possible victims, warn-
ing them about the imminence of the attack. 
Such a policy would increase  the chances 
that an organization would adopt the neces-
sary measures to mitigate  the negative ef-
fects. [7]   
The national EWS would generate  a con-
sistent database registering all the threats that 
affected  the  participating organizations. 
Through the MCE  module the information 
would be collected at the  central level and 
through the MCA module, important correla-
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to the collected information. In this way ma-
jor cyber security incidents would be detect-
ed. Therefore, the central level of the system 
(CERT-RO) would hold a huge amount of in-
formation that could represent solid evidence 
in support of decisions taken by policy mak-
ers in the field of cyber-security. The nation-
al cyber-security strategy could be grounded 
in the information provided by the national 
EWS.  Adopting the optimal security 
measures or the regulations needed for cyber-
crime mitigation should also be supported by 
relevant information collected at national 
level. Obviously, the national EWS would 
fulfill the above conditions. 
In order to develop such a system, the initia-
tor must have powerful reporting capabilities.  
Therefore we suggest that the system should 
also  have some reporting capabilities that 
could have the following functionalities: 
•  web portal – the most common or dan-
gerous threats, identified after the aggre-
gation and correlation process, will be 
published on a web portal, open to the 
public. The scope is to increase the 
awareness of the possible targets or other 
security specialists, about the real dan-
gers that could affect the national cyber-
space.  
•  cyber-security reports – based on the col-
lected information, the system would fur-
nish statistics relevant for decision mak-
ers nationwide. Nowadays such statistics 
do not exist in Romania, so we believe 
that these kinds of reports will be much 
appreciated by both private and public 
organizations, along with authorities that 
deal with cyber-crime. 
•  best-practice guides – the most common 
attacks nationwide should have a special 
treatment, meaning that countermeasures 
or specific recovery strategies should be 
developed for the affected parties or pos-
sible targets. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This article points out that assuring cyber-
security within an organization needs nowa-
days a more collaborative approach. Threats 
cannot be confined to a single computer sys-
tem just as much as computer systems be-
come useless when working in isolation. In-
terconnectivity forces organizations to better 
protect against cyber-crime, also contributing 
to the cyber-security community. 
When speaking of national cyber-security 
there is no other way than cooperation be-
tween involved parties [8]. In this complex 
and risky cyber environment, policymakers 
need help in deciding what represents a threat 
and how to tackle it. Therefore, they need 
simple and reliable information, such as an 
indicator, that should help them understand 
the cyber-threats and define strategies for se-
curing the national cyberspace against them. 
The methodology and the system architecture 
proposed here are designated to help the gov-
ernments collect and analyze  data about 
cyber-security incidents, and determine a 
cyber-security alert level for their countries. 
The article might seem rather prescriptive, in 
the sense that it tries to propose a real institu-
tional setup and specific implementation 
strategies for the national EWS. Neverthe-
less, most of the proposals suggested here 
have been paid growing attention by the na-
tional security bodies worldwide, and Roma-
nia has to start thinking more thoroughly 
about its cyber status quo, as well.  
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